Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been identified as a major contributing factor to the economic growth of developing nations (Osabutey & Debrah, 2012; Vijayakuma, Sridharan & Rao, 2009 ). Consequently, governments of developing nations such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) continue to employ various policies and strategies aimed at attracting FDI into their economies (Mmieh & Owusu-Frimpong, 2004 ). The recent global economic downturn resulted in fierce competition among these nations to attract much needed FDI (Baek & Qian, 2011) . The concept of FDI is underlined by Multinational Enterprises' (MNEs) quest to improve their fortunes through the exploitation of opportunities abroad. They achieve this by establishing lasting business interest in the chosen host country (Dunning, 1979) . These MNEs consider various variables before choosing investment location(s). These factors include economic, political, social, technological and legal variables. Strategic resources and capabilities of MNEs influence how they are influenced by political events (Frynas and Mellali, 2003) . One of the key considerations of MNEs prior to embarking on FDI is the expected impact of current and projected political situations in the prospective host nation(s) on business operations and performance, and the consequent effect on profitability of investments.
A review of existing literature on political risk and FDI revealed that although there is an evident focus on developing economies there is paucity of existing published empirical work on countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Quantitative studies that focus on specific SSA countries or sectors are scarce as most of the existing empirical works are multi-country studies. Cleeve (2012) , for example, studied political and institutional impediments to FDI inflows to SSA and used cross-sectional time series data to study 40 SSA countries. In a conceptual paper, Alon, Gurumoorthy, Mitchell and Steen (2006) emphasised the need for a framework for examining sector-specific micro-political risk. This clearly shows that there is a gap in the literature on how political risk influence sector-specific FDI inflow. Krifa-Schneider and Matei (2010) also studied political risk and FDI in developing economies using panel data from 33 developing and transition economies. Baek and Qian (2011) used the ICRG twelve political risk indicators to compare the impact of political risk on FDI between developing and developed countries using 116 samples drawn from both markets. Unfortunately, none of these studies covered in-depth analysis that focuses on a particular country and/or specific sector such as the telecommunications sector considered in this study.
Other noticeable gaps in the existing literature on the subject are the absence of studies that comprehensively covered the whole range of political risk components. Most studies looked at a few of the components with the most commonly studied components being democracy and corruption. Some of these works include Okafor, Ujah, Elkassabgi and Ajalie (2011) who studied democracy and FDI inflow in SSA. Asiedu (2006) Preliminary research has identified a number of indicators by which political risk is measured. Some of these indicators are: corruption, political stability, internal and external conflicts, ethnic and religious issues, socio-economic conditions, government policy and type of government (Aguiar, Auira-Conraria, Gulamhussen & Magalhaes, 2012; PRS, 2014) . We investigate the relationship between these political risk components and FDI. The main objective of the study, therefore, will be to investigate the influence of political risk on FDI inflow to SSA using the case of the Nigerian telecommunications industry. This study seeks to use political risk components and net FDI inflow data to provide answers to the following research questions:
 What is the impact of political risk on FDI inflow to developing economies?
 Which political risk components influence sector-specific FDI inflow into Africa?
 How do individual political risk components impact on the FDI inflow into the Nigerian telecommunications industry?
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, we review the theoretical and empirical literature on political risk and FDI. Second, we develop a contextual framework by giving insights into FDI inflow into the Nigerian telecommunications industry. Third, we discuss the adopted methodology and sources of data for this study. Fourth, we present and analyse the findings. Fifth, we conclude and discuss the implications of our findings and then set an agenda for future research.
Political risks are influenced by institutional factors. Home country institutions, which facilitate or constrain firm performance, establish the basis for economic activities of firms (North, 1990) .
Institutions govern societal transactions in the areas of politics (e.g. corruption, transparency), law (e.g. regulatory regime) and society (e.g. ethical norms) (Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008 Asiedu (2006) found a negative relationship between FDI and corruption she points out that corruption leads to weak enforcement of the law and was indeed a barrier to the conduct of effective business. Also, contrary to expectations, Cleeve (2012) found that the relationship between FDI inflows and corruption was not significant in explaining the SSA's FDI inflow.
The findings from existing literature on the influence of political risk on FDI inflow are mixed. Some studies found that political risk discourages FDI (Dunning, 1998; Asiedu, 2006; Baek & Qian, 2011; Hayakawa, Kimura & Lee, 2011) . Whilst others indicate that high political risk environments attract FDI (Janeba 2002; Dar-Hsin, Feng-Shun, & Chun-Da, 2005; Okafor et al., 2011) . A third group found an insignificant relationship between political risk and FDI flow (Jadhav 2012; Wei, 2000) . Additionally, others also argue that MNE home country political risk influence FDI location decisions (Sauvant, Maschek & McAllister, 2009 and Aguiar et al., 2012) .
Negative Effect of Political Risk on FDI Inflow
Most studies on the causal relationship between political risk and FDI arrived at the conclusion that high political risk discourages FDI in developing countries. Some of these studies are Asiedu (2006) , Bussman (2010) , and Amal, Tomio and Raboch (2010) . Amal et al. (2010) concluded that reduced corruption and political instability will enhance the flow of FDI into SSA. Asiedu (2006) observed that FDI to the region is driven by natural resources and suggested that smaller SSA countries with limited natural resources needed to improve their political and institutional infrastructure to attract much needed FDI.
Positive Effect of Political Risk on FDI Inflow
Some studies observed that conditions of high political risk in developing countries attract MNEs.
Dar-Hsin, Feng-Shun, and Chun-Da (2005), Janeba (2002) and Asiedu and Lien (2011) suggest that there is a positive relationship between political instability and FDI inflow. Dar-Hsin et al.
argued that some high political risks cause host country assets to be under-valued excessively to make them increasingly attractive to foreign investors. Janeba (2002) discovered that most high political risk environments become attractive FDI destinations because of low factor costs which serve as an acceptable risk trade off. This implies that foreign firms would be able to handle their operations in a cost effective manner, thereby reducing the cost of doing business and increasing profitability. MNEs may focus their FDI on high political risk markets to avoid competition from most other MNEs, who may be cautious about investing in such risky markets. Okafor et al. (2011) , and Li and Resnick (2003) , in separate studies focusing on the impact of the democratic component of political risk on the inflow of FDI, arrived at the same conclusion; that observance of democratic principles by developing countries discourages MNEs from investing in the countries. Okafor et al.'s (2011) study which focused on SSA discovered that the volume of FDI inflow to SSA declines as these countries progress to stronger and more proficient democracies. Arguably, these results could have been influenced by the dominance of investments from emerging markets who exploit the absence of democratic principles. It is not surprising, therefore, that Li and Resnick (2003) also observed that MNEs prefer to invest in developing countries with autocratic or totalitarian governments. Noting that, unlike democratic governments, autocratic governments are not answerable to their people and so can offer better incentives and protection from labour unions to the MNEs.
Insignificant Relationship between Political Risk and FDI Inflow
As indicated earlier, some other findings such as Asiedu (2002) SSA countries, found that foreign participation in various sectors is increasing because most SSA countries were opening up their economies through liberalization.
FDI in the Nigerian Telecommunication Industry
The Nigerian telecommunications industry started attracting significant MNE interests when it Table 1 . Table 2 ). These developing countries share similar political and institutional structures with Nigeria and thus lesser 'psychic distance'. Previous studies affirm that developing countries generally pose higher levels of political risks than developed countries (Jensen, 2008; UNCTAD, 2013) and that these developing countries view political risk in much the same way (Sauvant et al., 2009 and Aguiar et al., 2012) . The minimum number of points that can be assigned to each component is zero while the maximum point awarded to any particular risk component is pre-set (see Table 3 ) and depends on the relevance of that component to the overall risk of a country. To ensure consistency, both between countries and over time, the ICRG editors assign these points on the basis of a series of pre-set questions for each risk component (PRS, 2014 variables are generated. Particular emphasis is given to the relationship between the dependent and independent variables and these are ranked accordingly. Political risk components that correlated significantly with Net Telecoms FDI inflow were then analysed, via multiple backward regression to evaluate the extent to which significant variables can explain net FDI inflow. In line with the ICRG data, this analysis takes into consideration the fact that increases in the risk component points over a period signify the lowering of political risk.
Methodology and Sources of Data

Data Presentation and Discussion of Findings
From Table 4, General overview of the data indicates that some variables either remain constant or experience minimal change over the period. These include socio-economic conditions, corruption, military in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions and bureaucracy quality.
Bureaucracy quality, for example, seemingly, remained the same throughout the study period;
indicating that, in some cases, the individual variations may not adequately explain FDI inflow. 
FDI Inflow and Individual Political Risk Components
To evaluate the relationships further we generate correlation and regression results with the aim of ordering the importance of the variables. Table 6 depicts the relationship between all variables with particular focus on the relationship between net telecommunications FDI inflow (dependent variable) and the political risk component variables (independent variables). The relationships between all the variables, including composite political risk have also been shown in Table 6 . The variable Bureaucracy Quality as shown in Table 6 could not be computed because the Contrary to expectation, when the external conflict variable reduces (risk increases) FDI inflow increases. Although the evident trend of reduction in the score of the external conflict variable over the period is small it does appear to influence FDI inflow positively. On one hand, this trend could have resulted from a relative increase in one of the subcomponents (war, crossborder conflict, foreign pressures). According to the PRS group's evaluation, the external conflict variable assesses the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent to violent external pressure. Perhaps this change in the variable could have resulted from external diplomatic pressures or sanctions rather than cross-border conflicts or war.
It could also be argued that, in the telecommunications sector, non-violent external pressures do not significantly influence the expansion of operations. Also, in the event of cross-border conflicts, planned expansion into neighbouring countries are postponed, thereby prompting further expansion in the existing market. Although further research is required to strengthen this argument, it is plausible, in the Nigerian case, because of the relative large market size compared to neighbouring countries. In this regard, external pressures or conflicts were likely to benefit the larger economy. As expected, variable increase (risk reduction) for corruption, law and order, democratic accountability and investment profile increase FDI inflow. Reduced corruption gives an extra incentive to foreign firms to invest more because of the likelihood of improved returns on investment.
Backward multiple regressions of the variables with significant results from the correlation matrix in Table 6 together revealed that only corruption generated a significant result as shown in Table 7 . The R Square value of 0.655 is also an important result because it means that over 65% of FDI inflow into the Nigerian telecommunications sector is explained by corruption alone. This confirms that by reducing corruption alone, this would increase Nigeria's telecommunications FDI inflow tremendously.
Conclusion and Implications
This study investigated the influence of political risk on the attraction of FDI into developing economies in Africa with Nigeria telecommunications industry as the case study. We identified the various components of political risk and explored their aggregate and individual impacts on the inflow of FDI into Nigeria's telecommunications industry between 2002 and 2011. Our findings show that, in general, reducing the level of political risk (independent variable) resulted in increased FDI net inflows (dependent variable) into the Nigerian telecommunications industry.
The study also observed that Nigeria's political risk rating improved over the study period from 38.79 per cent in 2002 to 46 per cent in 2011 resulting in growth in net FDI inflow. This implies that political risk had a significant impact on the flow of FDI into the industry. Although Nigeria remained a country with a very high political risk rating (highest rating of 46%) over the period, the improvements were enough to attract huge net telecommunications FDI inflows.
Our study also indicates that the various political risk components affect FDI in different ways. It was found that reducing the risk with respect to corruption, law and order, democratic accountability and investment profile were important in influencing FDI inflow. Our findings emphasise the importance of reducing corruption to enhance foreign investment. This means that SSA countries, such as Nigeria, need to appreciate the importance of tackling the canker of corruption to improve FDI inflow which is intrinsically linked to economic growth. Considering the important role FDI plays in the economic growth of developing nations (World Bank, 2013) , and the fact that most economic determinants of FDI such as the availability of natural resources and large domestic markets are not within the control of governments (Baek and Qian, 2011) , this paper recommends that for developing countries to be globally competitive for scarce FDI, their governments should endeavour to promote favourable business environments to attract
MNEs. Based on our findings, the pertinent issues that need immediate attention must encompass tackling corruption in unison with improving law and order, democratic accountability, and investment profile. With regards to corruption, there is an urgent need for the provision of strong and independent anti-corruption institutions that can foster an improvement in transparency within both the public and private sectors. It is important that these processes can also ensure full independence and efficiency of the judiciary which will give added confidence to foreign investors that redress can be objectively sought in the law courts. Particularly, the PRS Group emphasise the need to control excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservation, exchange of favours, secret funding of political parties, and questionable close ties between business and politics. These tendencies would not only contribute to potential instability but have the tendency to increase long-term perceived host country political risk which is detrimental to FDI inflow.
Law and order, according to the PRS group, relates to the strength and impartiality of the legal system which must be supported by a general observance of the law. Democratic accountability, related to how responsive governments are to their people, is also crucial. SSA governments need to be accountable to their electorates to enhance their attractiveness to foreign investors. With investment profile, in line with the subcomponents, it is important that governments in SSA need to avoid payment delays, improve contract viability, eliminate expropriation tendencies, as well as allow profit repatriation, to reduce general political risk and therefore improve FDI attraction. Arguably, good governance and institutional arrangements are improving these.
Our contribution highlights that, irrespective of the political risk rating, consistent improvement in the rating serves as a good signal to foreign investor location decision making.
We also contribute further to the international business literature by ranking the potential risk components to stress their respective importance in explaining FDI inflow. Out study, for example, shows that corruption explains over 65% of FDI inflow into the Nigerian telecommunications industry. This study is also exemplified by attempting to suggest that the impact of political risk components vary from sector to sector as some components react to FDI inflow in different ways.
Despite our contributions, this study acknowledges the limitations of our approach.
Firstly, our study focused on only one sector, in one country, in SSA. Further studies covering a wider range of sectors and countries in SSA, collectively or comparatively, could enrich our understanding of the influence of political risk components on FDI inflow. Secondly, a study that is able to explore subcomponents would be needed to explain their influences on FDI inflow independently. Such an approach could help to explain each subcomponent's contribution to FDI inflow, positively or negatively, more clearly than the main component.
